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ABSTRACT ■
Most successful firms have an abundance of
new and old knowledge in their research and
development laboratories, and only a fraction is
being put into use in new product development.
This knowledge is left over from projects that
have been killed at different development
stages and may actually carry considerable
value. In this article, we propose a knowledge
bank as a possible solution to preserve and
possibly grow this knowledge. It is a selfsustaining institute with minimal or no ongoing
effort from the donor company, yet manages
the knowledge in a way that protects propri
etary interests and actively fosters communi
cation and interchange among sponsoring com
panies wherever possible. The framework of this
structure, as well as how it works, is described
here. Specifically, a system dynamics modeling
of the knowledge bank is developed, and a sim
ulation study is conducted using VENSIM®. The
results confirm the viability of creating such a
system in a consortium of organizations.
KEYWORDS: R&D projects; knowledge
banks; system dynamics

INTRODUCTION ■
any examples of dormant or abandoned projects can be found in
the research and development (R&D) laboratories of incumbent
corporations. These corporations are in a race of developing and
launching a steady stream of new products hoping to satisfy their
loyal customers and attract new customers in potential new markets. An
idea-to-launch process such as a stage-gate process guides the product
managers in terms of deciding which product-development projects have
merit to be investigated further and which ones to kill (Cooper, 1985). The
process consists of stages and gates. At the stages, a set of activities is per
formed to develop the product concept further, and the gates are structured
as decision points where the gatekeeper, typically the sponsor or product
manager, evaluates the performance of the project to date and makes a
go/kill decision. This evaluation can be done on the basis of a ranking rec
ommended by Linton and Walsh (2004), or on the basis of R&D performance
indices developed by Osawa and Yamasaki (2005). Many product-development
projects are typically terminated at different gates throughout the process,
and resources are reallocated to more promising projects. After starting with
numerous product concepts, only a few survive to reach the later develop
ment stages, and only one may be introduced to the markets.
But what happens to the abandoned or “killed” projects at these various
gates? Depending upon when they are terminated, they might carry consid
erable value. Many companies, however, consider these efforts as sunk or
stranded costs and walk away, although years later there could be renewed
interest, resulting in an effort to resume them. This article addresses the defi
ciencies in current corporate R&D practices to salvage these projects, and
offers a possible solution to knowledge loss in the form of what we call a
knowledge bank.

M

Dormant Projects
Dormant projects are defined as those projects that have extended breaks
due to events such as funding lapses, market readiness, temporary loss of
interest, external factors such as wars, or perhaps availability of supporting
or ancillary technologies (Tukel, Rom, & Kremic, 2007).
These projects do not go through typical project life cycles, and at the
time of termination, there is usually no clear indication of when or if they will
ever be restarted. In a stage-gate context, the company’s interest is to limit
any additional investment in these projects. Thus, very limited, if any, use is
made of knowledge management and retention tools, such as close-out doc
uments. The accumulated loss of knowledge is substantial since, over the
years, the vast majority of new product-development projects initiated will
not be completed. Although some corporations seek patents for some of the
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Figure 1: Product/technology development life cycle.

efforts put into the development as a
way to recoup some of the value of their
investment, early terminations might
prevent this (Elmquist & Masson, 2009).
The product/technology develop
ment effort for dormant projects is
shown in Figure 1. This figure depicts the
well-known S-curve theory showing
the pattern of project progress. Both the
empirical and theoretical research that
has appeared in the literature in the last
30 years show that most new productdevelopment efforts follow an S-curve—
that is, slow-rapid-slow progress (see, for
example, Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1988;
Sahal, 1981). The y-axis specifies the
magnitude of improvement in the devel
opment of a product for a given period
of time in the project timeline. At the
early stages, the rate of progress is rela
tively slow since much of the technolog
ical knowledge is unknown. There is an
exponential growth of product/technol
ogy realization when the project is in full
swing (Christensen, 1992). At this stage,
quick response-to-market needs moti
vate companies to allocate more re
sources to the project. However, when
the project terminates immaturely (dor
mant period), the level of effort drops
sharply and project development comes
to a halt. The length of time between the
executions of successive starts impacts

the quality and relevance of the trans
ferred knowledge. When the time
between the termination of a project
and the restart of it is short, the project
environment can be quite similar and
thus result in a maximum usage of exist
ing knowledge. On the other hand, when
there are long lapses between project
implementations, then changes in the
project environment, which include
human resources and technology, lead
to loss of relevance of the accumulated
knowledge and thus causes the restart at
a lower level of development, indicating
that some level of rework is needed.
Issues When Reinstating Projects
Many of the individuals with tacit
knowledge who participated in the
early development stages of dormant
projects will have either lost the knowl
edge due to time lapses or are no longer
a part of the project. In other words, the
organization will not have the tacit knowl
edge when the product-development
project is revived, as tacit knowledge
remains with the people involved
(Koskinen, 2002).
There would also be significant
challenges with retrieving the explicit
knowledge. Documents would have been
discarded, lost, or inaccessible to those
seeking the knowledge. Documents may

become damaged or destroyed in stor
age, depending on the length of time
since they were deposited. Perhaps the
indexes or search tools designed to help
users find information in the docu
ments are lost or of such a nature that
the documents become useless. Perhaps
it may take longer to find the knowledge
than to re-create it. Storage media is also
a consideration. Information that is
stored in electronic format runs the risk
that by the time the information is
needed, the equipment, software, or
know-how to recover it won’t exist.
Along with the media, the formats
change. Databases come and go with
the spreadsheets and other software
that are required to process the data. So
along with having the right equipment,
the appropriate versions of the software
may also be required.
Another significant challenge exists
in determining what type of information/
data will be needed later. Due to the
uncertainty of R&D success and fail
ures, predicting how and where knowl
edge will be used is difficult. Technology
revolutions may radically change what
may currently seem valuable. For exam
ple, the growth of digital technology has
had a tremendous impact on various
media and entertainment industries,
resulting in the obsolescence of much of
the knowledge accumulated over a
century, such as optical film. Revoluti
onary leaps in technology, however, do
not occur that often. Thorough fore
thought and deliberate knowledge man
agement would be expected to offer
considerable benefit on project restarts.
Finally, it may be reasonable to
assume that organizations are efficient
and will not maintain a functional orga
nizational structure to support work
that no longer exists. The possibility of
renewed activity years in the future may
not result in a decision to bridge that
long gap. The implication, of course, is
that there will be no internal group to
nurture the skills and knowledge.
The following are two examples of
dormant projects. Although they were
implemented in relatively different

Development of Electrical Vehicle
Technology
A good example that illustrates
the occurrence of interruptions in the
development of a product is electric
vehicles. The first electric car was built
by 1839, and, by the 1900s, American car
companies (including the Electric Vehicle
Company) were making electric vehicles.
By this date, 1,575 electric cars had been
produced. It appeared that electric cars
were to be the transportation of choice
for the future. Considerable research and
development efforts by corporations as
well as entrepreneurs continued to
improve electric-car technology until the
challenges posed by gasoline-powered
cars were overcome. The assembly-line
production of low-priced, lightweight,
gas-powered vehicles disrupted the
electric car markets to the extent that,
by 1913, electric cars and the technolo
gy investment in electric vehicles were
almost completely wiped out. Electric
vehicles totally disappeared from U.S.
markets by 1935.
The years between 1935 and the
1960s were dormant years for electric
vehicle development projects. In the
1960s and 1970s, there was a growing
need for alternative vehicles to reduce
the problems of exhaust emissions
from internal combustion engines and
to reduce the dependency on imported
foreign crude oil. This need in the econ
omy restored the investment into
electric-car technology. Many new
attempts to produce practical electric
vehicles occurred during the years from
1960 to the present. During that 30-year
period, not only electric vehicle pro
duction but also the knowledge created
to produce electric cars went dormant.
Since no one company or individual
was the sole owner of the technology,
no one company or individual retained
and improved upon the knowledge
(Motavalli, 2001).

Level of Product/Technology Development

industries, they both have similar char
acteristics, and their technology devel
opment efforts both follow the one we
suggested in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: EV development cycle.

It is only since after the 1990s that
the big three automobile companies
in the United States started producing
electric vehicles for mass markets.
General Motors developed the EV1 for
the California market, although it was
subsequently withdrawn. Typically,
these organizations retained limited
explicit knowledge and none of their
tacit knowledge from the 1920s and
1960s when the electrical vehicle devel
opment projects were revived.
The product-development effort is
depicted in Figure 2. The long dormant
period from the early 1910s to the 1960s
is the main reason for this technology
to almost start from scratch. Obviously,
many knowledge management (KM)
tools such as repositories and portals
were not in existence, and most devel
opment efforts were kept in written
documents that were lost as car compa
nies vanished. Another issue that may
have contributed to the lost knowledge
was that although the kernel knowledge
on electrical vehicles was applicable, by
the 1960s electric car manufacturing
processes and technology were not. A
further challenge was that technology
in combustion engine–driven automo
biles had continued to improve. This
resulted in longer-than-expected devel
opment times in electric vehicle tech
nology, higher development costs, and

thus high sales prices, slower speeds,
and shorter trip ranges. In general, this
resulted in poorer performance of elec
tric vehicles compared with what users
of the day expected from their cars.
Development of Nuclear Technology
at NASA
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s (NASA’s) investment in
nuclear technology began in the late
1950s with the initiation of the Rover
and the Nuclear Energy for Rocket
Vehicle Application (NERVA) programs.
These projects were implemented in
cooperation with the Atomic Energy
Commission. The Rover project was
a technology development effort
conceived to develop small nuclearpowered rocket engines as possible
backups for chemically powered rock
ets. Its sister project, NERVA, was for
mulated to achieve both ground and
flight demonstration of nuclear ther
mal-powered rocket engines (Bowles &
Arrighi, 2004).
For approximately 25 years, NASA
continued to study and build knowl
edge on nuclear-based propulsion and
power. Materials were characterized in
the radiation environment. Propellant
formulation experiments were conduct
ed. Engine designs were assessed and
tested. During this process, numerous

and nuclear technology development
was an important aspect of the efforts
under this program. For a variety of rea
sons, NASA chose to partner with Naval
Reactors (NR), which is associated with
both the Navy and the U.S. Department
of Energy. NR is a research organization
that specializes in reactor designs and
was given roles in the design of nuclear
portions of the JIMO mission. The
renewed interest by NASA was to be
short-lived. Events with the space shut
tle, demands of the International Space
Station, and the new vision for space
exploration that was announced in
2004 placed increasing demand on the
NASA budget to the point that the U.S.
$10-to-15-billion JIMO mission was
cancelled as well as the nuclear work
started at NR. As of 2006, only a few mil
lion dollars is budgeted for nuclear
technology work and is simply an
attempt at sustaining some level of
nuclear capability within NASA. The
progress of nuclear technology develop
ment at NASA is presented in Figure 3.

Content of Knowledge Banks
A firm can be made up of a variety of
differing resources that allow it to com
pete within the market (Barney, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984). Resources (that is,
machinery, capital, etc.) can be either

NASA Nuclear Technology Development

reports were written, processes and
procedures were developed, hardware
was fabricated, and personnel were
trained. By 1973, knowledge on this
subject had come a long way. In fact, 20
nuclear thermal propulsion rocket
engines had been built and tested.
These ranged from relatively small 25
kW engines up to 250-kW devices. The
technology was so promising that it was
planned as a backup approach to power
lunar spacecraft in the event that the
primary chemical-propulsion options
failed to meet mission requirements.
By the early 1970s, the environment
for NASA changed dramatically. The
Apollo program, once a well-funded
effort clearly in the public eye, began to
lose public interest. Missions to the
moon, the ability to get there, and
the retrieval of specimens ceased to
have relevance for many. The high cost
of the NASA programs, the resource
needs in other areas, and the lack of
public interest all combined to cause
the U.S. Congress to abruptly end the
Apollo program. Without the Apollo
program and NASA funds shifting to the
development of the space shuttle, there
was no obvious near-term demand for
nuclear power or propulsion; thus,
NERVA and Rover were terminated.
The project remained dormant for
approximately 15 years until the start of
the space exploration initiative. Nuclear
technology was explored for powering
100-kW nuclear electric propulsion
thrusters under the so-called SNAP
(Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power)
program (Bennett, Hemler, & Schrock,
1996). This investment abruptly ended
in 1993 shortly after the change in pres
idential administrations. Investment in
nuclear technology lay dormant again,
this time for about a decade.
The restart of nuclear technology
development in 2003 was also a result
of political changes. This program
included both technology development
as well as a robotic science mission to
the icy moons of Jupiter, called the
JIMO mission. Nuclear technology was
essential to accomplish this mission,
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used immediately or stored to provide a
future benefit to a firm. A firm’s resources
can be represented by the knowledge
used to produce new products and
processes (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996).
Knowledge resources can also be used
immediately or stored to provide a
future benefit to a firm. The proposed
knowledge bank is an accumulation of
these knowledge resources that do not
possess a current benefit to the firm but
may be of future value.
Knowledge contained within a
firm’s current and dormant projects
represents a stock of stored knowledge.
Moorman and Miner (1997) refer to this
stock of knowledge as organizational
memory. For organizational memory to
be useful, it should be in a storable and
retrievable format (Huber, 1991). When
organizational memory stocks are
retrieved, they have two positive aspects
to a firm in its development of products.
The first benefit is the ability to remem
ber what has worked in the past, and
the second benefit is the ability to
remember what did not work (Day,
1991). Both of these qualities of the
knowledge bank can allow firms to
access the successes and failures of pre
vious projects so that what went right
and what went wrong can be retained
and remembered at a future time.

Political
Factors

SEI
Initiative

Dormant
Period
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1988

Figure 3: NASA nuclear technology development cycle.
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Creation of Knowledge Banks
It is clear in the previous examples that
the reasons a project goes dormant—
namely, lack of funds, lack of current
interest, or external environmental
factors—imply that minimal resources,
desire, and effort will be available inter
nally to retain the knowledge and tech
nology developed. Given this situation,
a feasible method that can be employed
by a corporation for salvaging knowl
edge requires minimal or no ongoing
effort, inherent staying power, and
management of knowledge in a way
that protects proprietary interests yet
actively fosters communication and
interchange whenever possible.
Staying power in this context refers
to the ability of the solution process to
sustain its own existence for long peri
ods of time relatively independent of
external events. Because dormant proj
ects will likely be in a dormant state for a
long and unknown period of time, one
cannot easily estimate how much
resources or time will be required to

bridge the dormancy gap. Therefore,
knowledge-management solutions will
need to be unique and independent of the
project—and possibly even the organi
zation that sponsored the project.
Managing knowledge such that
proprietary interests are protected yet
open information is actively shared is
key to long-term knowledge manage
ment for dormant projects. Once again,
it must be assumed that the organiza
tional resources and structure that
support the project cease to exist dur
ing the dormant period. Assuming also
that valuable and possibly proprietary
knowledge exists under the project,
one must find a place to store that
knowledge or, better yet, a place to
grow that knowledge even during dor
mancy. The need to foster and grow
the knowledge outside of the organi
zational boundaries is a common situ
ation faced by most organizations,
which might motivate them to
form consortia or alliances (West &
Gallagher, 2006).

If a project or organization has
knowledge that is not needed in the
immediate future, it should be stored
with an entity that specializes in man
aging knowledge—that is, an institute.
Ideally, the knowledge will be managed
such that more comes out than was ini
tially put in. The term knowledge bank
(KB) describes an institute that per
forms this function. Figure 4 shows the
proposed structure. It is a dynamic sys
tem that consists of several elements.
The resources needed for the KB to fos
ter and grow the knowledge are human
resources such as researchers, scien
tists, librarians, students, or faculty;
knowledge resources such as docu
ments, manuals, databases, or licenses;
and physical resources such as comput
er hardware and software, equipment,
and buildings. The KB requires funding
initially from sponsoring companies,
although with time, the value created
would enable the bank to sustain itself.
Similar collaborative structures have
appeared in high-innovation growth

Knowledge Bank

Organization

RESOURCES
Human Resources
Students
Researchers
Faculty
Knowledge Resources
Documents
Databases
Manuals
Licenses
Physical Resources
Computers
Materials
KBO
Data Administrators
Technicians
Librarians
Funds

R&D Knowledge Base
Organization

Organization

Sponsoring Companies

Value Creation

Organization
Knowledge Retrieval

Organization

Figure 4: KB framework.

areas such as nanotechnology, media lab
oratories, and computing (Chesbrough &
Crowther, 2006). MIT established a media
laboratory around 1985, with the inten
tion of creating a structure that allows
researchers to pursue radical and risky
projects that would otherwise not be
funded in a typical corporate environ
ment (Brand, 1988). Similarly, the
Albany Nanotech Center provides a
common place for creating alliances
among companies like IBM and Sony to
support their R&D work (www.albany
nanotech.org). They suggest an open
innovative strategy where knowledge is
freely shared across participating
organizations. Although there are
structural similarities among these and
the KB, what makes the KB unique is
that the knowledge that is being
deposited is not of current interest to
the contributing organization; howev
er, it might be of interest to the other
organizations or become of interest
again to the contributing organization
at a later point in time. The KB is also
different from alliances in that alliances
require continuous commitment to the
partnership and focus only on active
research projects.
As presented in Figure 4, the
resources are used as inputs to the value-

creation process. This is the stage where
the knowledge creation takes place by
harvesting knowledge and technology
from different sponsoring companies,
or by further developing the concept
into its final form. The results of these
efforts are considered to be the output
of the KB that will be available to spon
soring companies and other organiza
tions. As a result, the knowledge that
had no value to the organization at one
point in time is salvaged and improved
to become valuable at a later time.
While the KB concept is simple and
intuitive, the practical aspects of suc
cessfully implementing this concept
may be less than trivial. For example, the
details of how to capture and deposit
the knowledge, how to store it, how to
support the process during dormancy,
and how to extract the knowledge are
not that simple. There are, however, rea
sonable approaches that may be consid
ered and utilized. These are based on the
concepts of minimizing costs, sharing
those costs across the broadest set of
possible benefactors, and maintaining
knowledge-management processes that
treat all depositors fairly.
• The prerequisites to become a sponsor
ing member: In order for an organiza
tion to participate in the KB, there

needs to be two underlying business
processes in place: (1) an idea-to
launch process such as stage-gate,
which enables periodic evaluation
and documentation of development
projects, and (2) a parallel running
knowledge-retention process, which
captures knowledge as generated dur
ing the development stages. Figure 5
shows this system. When projects are
terminated prematurely at the gates,
the knowledge generated will be sal
vaged by transferring it to the KB. The
knowledge transferred can consist of
prototypes, progress reports, lessonslearned documents, manuals, blue
prints, licenses, or patent documents.
It is important to deposit all the docu
mentation in a form that will be easy
to access and retrieve. The KB should
develop standards to guide compa
nies in terms of preparing their docu
ments and reports prior to submission,
so that at the KB, data-mining tools are
more effective.
• Stakeholders: The main stakeholders
are the sponsoring and contributing
organizations. These companies gain
access to the knowledge and intellec
tual property (IP) generated at the
bank. Over time, new alliances and
partnerships can be added to sustain

Internal Knowledge Retention Process
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Generation
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Gate 1

Detailed
Analysis

Gate 2
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No

No
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To KB

To KB

Stage Gate Process

Figure 5: Knowledge-retention process.

Development
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Validation

Commercialization

the knowledge base (Alves, Marques,
Saur, & Marques, 2007). The licensing
of the IP adds to the pool of stake
holders of the bank and diversifies the
background of the stakeholders.
• Knowledge bank office (KBO): The KB
needs resources to manage the
steady stream of knowledge coming
from the sponsoring organizations.
The individuals that manage the
office could be assigned on a rotating
basis from the sponsoring organiza
tions. This office centralizes and coor
dinates the management of projects
as well as controls communications
with the sponsoring organizations.
One of the critical activities at the
office is the identification of the rele
vance of the knowledge to be deposit
ed to the underlying theme of the
bank. The KB can accept the R&D
knowledge base from diverse indus
tries. Thus, another function of the
KB is to facilitate industry conver
gence for innovation (Broring &
Leker, 2007).
• Intellectual property ownership:
Similar to many other collaborative
research centers, such as MIT’s Media
Lab (Haase, 2000), the ownership
of IP resides with the KB, although
the KB is committed to license it
to the member organizations. The
licensing arrangements should be
made on a nonexclusive basis, mean
ing that any member organization
can gain access, regardless of the ori
gin of the knowledge. In a recent
study, Aoki and Schiff (2008) suggest
the creation of IP clearinghouses as a
means of promoting accessibility to
licenses and patents. KB can assume
such a role as well.
• Resources: The employees of the bank
should include researchers, scientists,
librarians, and an intellectual property
specialist. In addition to full-time
employees, employees may be
assigned on a rotating basis from
the sponsoring companies; they could
also include students working as
interns and faculty from research uni
versities. The employees in general are

responsible for adding value to the
knowledge made available. Knowledge
resources are critical inputs to the
value-creation process. The useful
ness, completeness, and the readiness
of the documentation impact the effort
required to store and grow the knowl
edge. Knowledge-mining tools would
be required in this process. Additional
resources in the form of laboratory
equipment, computer hardware and
software, and digital instruments may
also be required to investigate the find
ings provided by the sponsors. The
allocation of these different types of
resources should be done in an aggre
gate project planning (APP) framework
(Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). This
framework enables the KB to classify
work based on different criteria such as
risk, time, and resource needs, and
pursue a suitable portfolio of research.
• Funding: After the initial setup of the
bank by the members, funding needs
to come from the sale or licensing of
development work and knowledge.
Since most members are unwilling to
subsidize the knowledge bank on an
annual basis, the KB would need
ongoing sources of income. Unlike
the media laboratory, because of the
constraints imposed by the intellec
tual property issues, the KB is limited
in terms of the type of contracts they
can pursue.
• Value creation: KB creates a rather
comprehensive knowledge resource
from the experiences of many organi
zations. Organizing this knowledge
and making it accessible by using datamining techniques or indexing creates
considerable value. Once the work is
organized in an APP framework,
researchers and scientists can also add
value in the form of advancing the core
knowledge and/or further advancing
the commercial development.
• Knowledge retrieval: Periodic semi
nars, demonstrations, and open
houses are all good ways to inform the
member organizations about the
work being done. Then, when there is
renewed interest by the organization

regarding a dormant project, it can be
resurrected using the KB. Withdrawal
of the knowledge can also come in
the form of hiring, internships, and
rotational assignments by researchers
or project employees or possibly
through lectures or other negotiated
training processes.
• Communication: In order for mem
ber organizations to communicate
with each other as well as with the
KB, a private industrial network can
be set up. The network can be Internetbased, and owned and operated by the
KB. It can provide a platform for mem
ber organizations to share knowledge
and closely collaborate. It also enables
the fast and accurate deposit of knowl
edge. In a recent study, Parise and
Henderson (2001) indicate that the
critical aspect of knowledge exchange
between the partners is the position
or role of the partner in that industry.
A partner can have dual roles, as a
competitor and complementor, which
might impact the tacitness, specificity,
and complexity of the knowledge
being transferred. A partner-resource
exchange model can be implemented
to improve the partnership.
Universities as Knowledge Banks
There are several possible approaches to
capturing and depositing the knowledge
into the KB. Institutions that have KM
programs are well versed in knowledgecapture practices and could offer these
services. Given that this could be a
long-term need and relationship, they
may have an incentive to subsidize the
costs of facilitating the knowledge cap
ture. Depending on the nature of the
knowledge and university objectives,
the university may be interested in
picking up some key employees. From
the project’s and organization’s per
spective, they may view this as a form of
outsourcing and may be willing to
transfer some key employees and per
haps even agree to share salary costs to
ensure full transfer. Universities are in
the business of managing knowledge
and would be the most efficient at it.

Universities can be unbiased and per
haps perform a pooling function for
several organizations that may be in
similar positions. Since universities are
generally not driven by the desire to
make and sell tangible commodities,
they may be the one place that several
competing organizations can come to,
jointly sponsor, and expect a fair return
on the invested knowledge.
Simulation of Knowledge and
Revenue Growth
Knowledge, regardless of where it is
generated (either at the organizational
level or at the knowledge bank), follows
an S-curve growth (Christensen, 1992).
Given the growth rate of knowledge, the
amount of knowledge that accumulates
is a function of the current level of
knowledge and how far it is from its
technological limit. We use the follow
ing equation to represent this:
Kt = Kt-1 + g a
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L
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Figure 6: Knowledge accumulation over time.
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where g is the growth rate, Kt is the
knowledge level at time t, and L is the
technological limit. A hypothetical
knowledge level being between 1 and
100, with an aggressive growth rate of 0.2,
Figure 6 represents the knowledge accu
mulation over a 70 time period at the
bank. At around time 40, the knowledge
level Kt is almost at the technological
limit, while a smaller value for g would
delay reaching the limit to a later period.
The revenue that an organization
can receive during the rapid growth of
knowledge should also grow rapidly but
should slow down and even may
decline as the knowledge reaches its
technological limit. Thus, the following
equation will be used to develop the
revenue graph in Figure 7.
Rt = Rt-1 * rev_growth
+ max(0, Kt - mrev) * rev_increase
- max(0, Kt - marav * L )
* rev_decrease,
where Rt is the revenue at time t and
rev_growth is the percentage of revenue
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Figure 7: Revenue generation.

carryover from the previous period.
When the knowledge level gets beyond
mrev, a portion of that (rev_increase)
leads to additional revenue, while when
knowledge gets closer to its limit, larger
than marav, there is a decline in rev
enue, rev_decrease. The corresponding
cumulative profit is given by:
t

pt = a (Ri - ci ),
i=1

where ci is the cost incurred in period i
and pt is the profit at time t. In the
equation, we assume that the develop
ment cost is linearly related to time. In
the revenue figure (Figure 7), we used
R1 = 0, rev_growth = 0.95, mrev = 20,
rev_increase = 0.16, marav = 0.8, and

rev_decrease = 0.6, and in the profit fig
ure (Figure 8), we used ci = 50 for all i.
Note that the specific values we used
to develop the graphs are chosen arbi
trarily, although the functional forms
resemble expected patterns. Further
more, in the simulation study presented
in the next section, rather than treating
the parameters as constants, we also
introduced randomness into the equa
tions. Most organizations have a number
of projects that would follow this pattern
of evolution, although with different val
ues for the parameters. For the projects
that are not pursued by organizations
internally, the knowledge bank can be
used as an outlet to salvage value out of
them. The next section shows how.

licenses, which then generates revenue
for the participating firms. The revenue
also adds to the available resources. The
overall system has a balanced polarity.
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Figure 8: Cumulative profit.

System Dynamics Modeling
of KB
System Dynamics (SD) is a methodolo
gy for studying and managing complex
feedback systems, such as one finds in
business and in other social structures
(Sterman, 2000). The suggested KB
model possesses interactions and feed
back mechanisms between the collabo
rating organizations and the bank, and
thus SD can be used to examine the
impact of decisions on the system. As
policy decisions are enacted, they can
start to change the system itself. Policy
decisions must also be revisited at each
iteration to access their impact on the
system. As a policy decision’s impact

changes the system, it may no longer be
valid and may require adjustment.
Figure 9 shows the causal loop diagram
for a possible KB.
The diagram consists of two loops
that impact the overall model. The first
loop is the negative loop that shows
cause-and-effect relationships among the
KB, resources, and the knowledgecreating firms. As the knowledge bank
increases in size, it requires more resources,
which has a negative influence on the
resources available to transfer the knowl
edge from the participating firms. The
second loop is the positive loop. As the
knowledge bank increases in size, there is
more development of the knowledge into

Profits

+

Knowledge
Creation in Firms
+

+

Resources

-

-

License and
Commercialization of
Knowledge

+

+

+
Knowledge Bank

Delay
+

Figure 9: KB causal loop.

Knowledge
Transformation Process

The Stock and Flow Map of KB
Figure 10 is the stock and flow map of
the KB system based on the causal loop
diagram.
Knowledge flows through the sys
tem as follows. The knowledge accumu
lated from the terminated projects at
each firm is submitted to the KB. At KB,
the accumulation rate of knowledge
follows the graph in Figure 6. Some of
this knowledge ages and becomes
obsolete, and thus will be removed
from the KB stock. On the other hand,
some of it will become commercially
viable in the form of licenses and will
create profits. A portion of the profit
will stay in the KB system in the form of
resources, while some will be returned
to the firms.
Computational Results
The model described earlier and pre
sented in Figure 10 is simulated using
VENSIM. VENSIM is a software applica
tion that can be used for developing and
analyzing dynamic feedback models.
Models can be constructed either
graphically or in a text editor. There are a
number of modeling applications using
VENSIM that can be found in the litera
ture (see, for example, Eberlein &
Peterson, 1992; Garcia, 2006; Morecroft &
Sterman, 1994). We assume that there
are three firms and each firm generates
knowledge based on a beta distribution.
If the knowledge created exceeds a
threshold value, the knowledge is avail
able to be transferred to the KB. To trans
fer knowledge to the KB, resources must
be used. The KB has a resource require
ment equivalent to the natural log of its
size. We further assume that the aging of
knowledge results in a 10% reduction in
the bank per year. Knowledge transfor
mation is assumed to take place only
when the knowledge accumulation
exceeds a threshold value, which is
determined by beta distribution.

Firm 1

To KB (Firm 1)

Internal Profits

Resources

Expended
resources

Firm 2

To KB (Firm 2)

Profits
(Internal)
To KB (Firm 3)

Profits
(External)

Firm 3

Knowledge Bank
KB
Transformation

Knowledge
Transformation
Process

License and
Commercialization
of Knowledge

Aging
Knowledge

Threshold

Figure 10: Stock and flow map of KB.

units) for the stakeholders. The y-axis in
Figure 12 represents the aggregation of
resources available (refer to Figure 4)
indicated by a common measure such
as monetary value. It is important to
note that even though we set the system

to require 70% of profits to be invested
back in the resources, the KB system
can still deliver healthy profits to the
stakeholders. This is an encouraging
result for consortiums to consider cre
ating a knowledge bank.

Confidence Interval
50%
90%
100%

Knowledge Bank
200

150
Knowledge

If a successful KB transformation
takes place, there is a four-time period
delay before it generates a profit. The
profits generated are proportional to
the level of the KB transformation. We
assume that 70% of profit generated is
invested back in the KB system, allowing
the rest to accrue to the stakeholders.
The equations that control the evolu
tion of simulation are given in the
Appendix.
Figures 11 to 13 present the results
of the study. Figure 11 shows the accu
mulation rate of knowledge in the bank
over a 120 time period. The y-axis rep
resents the level of knowledge, with an
initial starting value of 100. Although
there is no clear consensus regarding a
unit of measurement, some proposed
units are lines of code and bytes of data
or documentation (Kanevsky & Housel,
1998). The change in shades in the
graphs indicates various confidence lev
els. Figure 12 shows the resource accu
mulation in the system, and Figure 13 is
the profits generated (in monetary
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Figure 11: Knowledge level at KB stock.
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Figure 12: Resource usage in the system.
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Figure 13: Profit generation.

Conclusions and Future
Research
The formation of alliances and innova
tion networks to develop, manufacture,
and market new products continues to
grow (Parise & Henderson, 2001).
Companies form alliances with the
intention of accessing capabilities that
they lack, to transfer knowledge and
technology and expedite the access to
markets, among other reasons. IBM’s

recent effort to make collaborative work
by opening up research laboratories to
other companies, including possible
competitors, has been discussed in the
literature (Hamm, 2007). In general,
these major companies believe that suc
cess is possible only when you team up
with other companies, or even with
individual researchers (Chesbrough,
Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). What
makes the KB concept different from a

typical alliance is that in alliances, all
parties involved have an interest in pur
suing the technology, while in the KB
structure, parties do not have interest
in pursuing the development of the
technology or allocating further
resources to that technology. The KB
houses and further develops these
unwanted technologies without any
consideration to the possible commer
cialization aspect of it. The KB also dif
fers in the sense that it is an independ
ent clearinghouse of ideas where
the contributor and the acquirer of the
knowledge need not have any direct
contact.
A new knowledge-management
concept is presented here that is aimed
at addressing the unique needs of dor
mant projects. The concept, termed
knowledge bank, is founded on concep
tually simple notions that are based on
low-cost, efficient, and perpetual self
sustainment, as well as unbiased
knowledge management. These attri
butes of the knowledge bank offer the
project organization the best chance of
preserving and possibly even growing
the respective knowledge. Rather than
having periodic setbacks due to dorman
cy, the development of the R&D projects
continues, partially due to the KB.
Some questions that invite further
research include the determination of
how to decide what knowledge to cap
ture and store. Knowing that in the
future some form of the knowledge will
be needed, how does one go about
deciding which knowledge to capture? It
is unlikely that many projects will have
the ability to collect most of the explicit
knowledge and regain access to some of
the tacit knowledge as the NASA reactor
decommissioning project had. Of
course, there is also much more that
could be discussed about capturing the
identified knowledge, its storage, its
growth, and its eventual dissemination.
There are also other possible ways
of implementing the knowledge bank
concept. Consortia exist today that, in
some cases, serve as think tanks, and
perhaps these also may want to develop

a focus on long-term knowledge cap
ture and retention. These may have the
advantage of already having a pooled
set of resources and interests that may
make it easier to transition into a
knowledge-broker role. ■
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APPENDIX
Based on the stock and flow map of KB in Figure 10, the equations used in the VEN
SIM study are as follows:
Knowledge transferred from firm i to KB in period t is:
To KBit = 100 X a

Resourcest - 150
Resourcest

b X max5b(4,2) - 0.8, 06,

where the threshold value is set to 150 units.
The resources used in period t are:
Expended resources t =

a To KBit - ln[KBt ]

all firms

The level of knowledge left in the bank in period t is:
KBt =

a To KBit - Aging Knowledget - KB Transformationt + KBt-1

all firms

The amount of knowledge transformed into a license or other commercializa
tion is:
KB Transformationt = if {KBt X b (4, 2) - 0.8 > Threshold, b(4, 2) X KBt , 0}
where the threshold value is set to 10.

Post-print standardized by MSL Academic Endeavors, the imprint of the Michael Schwartz Library at Cleveland State University, 2015

